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The minds of insects 
Barbara Webb 
School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh 
Andy Clark’s philosophical thought and writing run in a strangely parallel course to my own research. 
On the face of it, our topics and approaches have little in common. I work on insects and robots: 
trying to build detailed, plausible models of the physical and neural mechanisms underlying specific 
behaviours,  such as how crickets detect the wind front created by a predator strike and take rapid 
evasive action (Webb 2002), or how the spring-and-damper mechanics of the body segments of 
maggots can give rise to coordinated peristalsis with only local feedback (Ross et al. 2015). 
Meanwhile Clark has sought to develop a unified vision of how cognitive, potentially conscious, 
creatures such as ourselves ‘get a grip’ on the world, masterfully drawing together a wide range of 
philosophical, psychological and neuroscientific insights (Clark & Grush 1999; Clark & Chalmers 
1998; Clark 1997; Clark 2013). Nevertheless, our paths continue to cross
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, in sometimes surprising, 
and I hope productive, ways.  
In particular, as I will try to illustrate in the remainder of this chapter, the insect systems I study can 
provide useful ‘edge cases’ against which to test any supposedly general, or “truly unifying account of 
perception, cognition and action” (Clark 2015, p.2). Indeed it is still a subject of sharp debate whether 
the term cognition should be applied to insects at all (Menzel & Giurfa 2006; Giurfa 2013; Webb 
2012), although it is hard to deny that many of the key examples discussed by Clark in the context of 
human behaviour have close parallels in insect capabilities. The dragonfly  easily outperforms most 
baseball fielders in their ability to intercept a small moving target (Mischiati et al. 2014). Bees have a 
spatial memory flexible enough to incorporate information about far distant food sources they have 
gained from another bee’s dance communication into their own experience, so as to take novel short 
cuts (Menzel et al. 2011).  Leaf cutter ants extend their behavioural repertoire by building complex 
nest structures surrounded by foraging highways, which supports ‘farming’ of a symbiotic fungus, 
including temperature regulation through turret construction (Cosarinsky & Roces 2012). Yet it seems 
the “brain” envisioned by Clark in much of his writing is exclusively a mammalian one, with the 
cortex the key structure on which to ground theoretical concepts such as predictive processing. 
If we can extend the same explanations, as well as grant at least some of the same capacities, to 
insects, this may offer some advantages for cognitive neuroscience, i.e., understanding how brains 
actually implement the proposed mechanisms. Insect neural circuits are more accessible in a variety of 
ways: amenable to a wide variety of tools for measuring or manipulating brain activity while 
measuring behaviour; and on a scale that we can plausibly model at the single identified neuron level. 
But even at the conceptual level, insects potentially offer the nearest thing we have to an ‘alien’ 
intelligence, that is, an intelligence that emerged from an independent evolutionary pathway 
(assuming our pre-Cambrian common ancestor did not cognize). As such, the extent to which they 
have converged on the same solution(s) is clearly of interest. 
To date, insects have served Clark’s philosophy more as an example of embodiment than as an 
example of mind: illustrating the dynamic links of brain, body and environment that produce 
behaviour and cannot be easily decomposed into distinct sensing, planning and action processes. 
Thanks to Andy’s promotion (Clark 2001), my earlier research on cricket phonotaxis (Webb 1994) 
                                                          
1
often literally, as we work in adjacent buildings 
has become a popular example of the principle. To briefly recap: a female cricket can find a mate by 
orientating towards the song produced by a male, which seems to require filtering to recognise the 
species specific frequency and chirp pattern as well as determination of the sound direction 
(Schildberger 1988). However, solving the second problem contains at least a partial solution to the 
first, and moreover depends far more on the physical structure of the auditory apparatus than on 
internal processing. The cricket’s ears are on its forelegs and are connected by a tracheal tube, 
forming a pressure difference receiver that is directional for sound (Boyd & Lewis 1983). The length 
of this tube already ‘tunes’ the animal to have the strongest directionality for the correct song 
frequency. This directionality is transduced by the cell properties of receptors and interneurons into a 
latency difference in firing (Pollack 1998). A simple (one neuron) comparison of latency to make the 
steering ‘decision’ to turn left or right will inherently depend on the temporal pattern. Thus the 
recognition problem is already solved. Implemented in a robot (Lund et al. 1997), the result is 
summarised in  Clark (2001), p106: “understanding the behaviour of the robot cricket requires 
attention to details that (from the standpoint of classical cognitive science) look much more like 
descriptions of implementation and environmental context than substantive features of an intelligent, 
inner control system”. Importantly, “it exploits highly efficient but (indeed, because) special purpose 
strategies”, and “it is not at all obvious that the robot cricket uses anything worth calling internal 
representations”. 
Myriad examples of this type have influenced the ‘embodied mind’ debate to the following extent: it 
now seems hard to deny that a full understanding of cognition in an acting agent requires moving 
beyond representation in the head to take into consideration the dynamic brain, body and environment 
interaction. Whether this means the ‘mind’ really exists beyond the head I will leave to other authors 
in this volume to explore. However, it remains notable that the embodied view is not yet mainstream 
amongst neuroscientists, who are still inclined to view neurons firing in response to an external 
stimulus as constituting ‘representation’ of that stimulus to the animal, and the brain’s principle task 
as decoding the signal to construct a veridical model of what is out there. Even more surprisingly, 
given the direct face-off with the reality of physics that robotics requires, the conventional robot 
engineering approach is still dominated by the assumption that obtaining an accurate internal world 
model is the crucial first step for any perception-action loop (the main advance is that these models 
are now typically expressed in a probabilistic form).  But what should have been learnt from the 
embodiment debate is that, from the animal (or robot) point of view, successfully controlling action is 
rarely helped by such decoding. The system needs to transform sensory signals into motor outputs, not 
reconstruct an accurate representation of the causes of those signals (Webb 2006). In recent work 
(Clark 2015), Clark has skilfully explained how maintaining the centrality of the embodied/dynamic 
perspective can prevent falling into this ‘reconstruction’ trap, even when the brain’s ability to infer 
and predict, indeed to represent, becomes the specific focus of enquiry. 
Following on from the cricket, my research group have explored a number of other insect/robot 
systems that similarly exploit the interaction of physical and neural mechanisms, in entangled 
feedback loops. For example, the turning behaviour of a walking insect, such as the cricket, might 
appear to require complex coordination of the large number of degrees of freedom in six, multi-
jointed legs (Petrou & Webb 2012). However it can be replicated by assuming the front legs alone 
target an attractive stimulus, and the mechanical linkage between the body and legs induces the 
appropriate motion in the remaining leg joints; as a consequence, simple local positive feedback to 
enhance the intrinsic motion is sufficient to replicate  realistic movement patterns (Rosano & Webb 
2007). For a flying insect, the problem of approaching odour sources carried on a complex, noisy 
wind-plume can potentially be explained by assuming odour-taxis exploits the existence of robust 
visual control loops for stabilisation and collision avoidance. If changes in odour concentration are 
used simply to alter the gain on these control loops, enhancing the tendency to keep flying in the 
current direction, the odour can be localised successfully (Stewart et al. 2010). These visuo-motor 
loops themselves depend on ‘matched filter’  processing (Wehner 1987) with neurons wired to be 
responsive to highly specific global motion patterns corresponding to imminent collision  (expansion) 
or tendency to veer from straight flight (global rotation) (Krapp & Hengstenberg 1996). 
What soon became a pressing question for us in trying to unravel and model these ‘simple’ behaviours 
in ‘simple’ animals was how insects manage to combine these various well-tuned sensorimotor loops 
into overall coordinated and adaptive action. A further ‘simple’ yet revealing example arose when 
(inspired by behavioural experiments from (Böhm et al. 1991)) we tried to equip our phonotactic 
robot with a basic optomotor reflex (Webb & Harrison 2000). The optomotor reflex, found in many 
animals including ourselves, occurs when the entire visual field appears to be rotating in one 
direction, to which the animal responds with a compensatory body or eye rotation. This reflex is 
adaptive for stabilisation, as the likely cause of such wide-field visual motion is that the animal is 
(unintentionally) drifting in its heading direction, thus the reflex allows the animal to keep looking or 
moving in the same direction with respect to its environment despite disturbances. But ‘unintentional’ 
is key. Our robot, attempting to turn left towards the sound, would immediately experience a strong 
rightwards optomotor stimulus, causing it to make a ‘corrective’ turn right, which was great for 
maintaining a straight course but entirely ineffectual if trying to track down a sound source. The 
solution seems obvious (and indeed was suggested more than fifty years ago (von Holst & 
Mittelstaedt 1950)) – the robot (or insect) should anticipate the predictable visual feedback from its 
intended rotation, and internally cancel out  the optomotor reflex (Webb & Reeve 2003). Yet this 
simple observation opened up a wide and ongoing research agenda, to understand what and how an 
insect brain predicts, and what role prediction plays in its successful adaptive behaviour. 
Thus my work again converged with Clark’s, around the conceptual centrality of prediction for even 
basic sensorimotor control, and how this might provide a scaffold on which a representational 
cognitive system might be built. In (Clark & Grush 1999), Clark and Grush discussed this in the 
particular form of an ‘emulator’ or forward model: for the animal to make a prediction of expected 
feedback, it needs to internally emulate the external contingencies that produce this feedback. Thus 
“emulator circuitry would constitute the most evolutionary basic scenario in which it becomes useful 
to think of inner states as full blooded representations” (p.7). So perhaps the cricket has internal 
representations after all? In 2004, I briefly surveyed the evidence for forward models in the insect 
brain (Webb 2004), and this seems a useful opportunity to mention some more recent evidence. 
In that article I discussed evidence from cricket auditory interneurons that, when a male is singing, an 
appropriately timed inhibition signal arrives to cancel out the response to each of its own chirps, 
allowing it to distinguish the songs of surrounding competitors. Since then, the specific neuron 
carrying this signal from the central pattern generator for song production to the auditory system has 
been identified (Poulet 2006). For the optomotor response discussed above, it has been reported in 
fruitflies that the key wide-field visual motion sensitive neurons involved in this reflex, the horizontal 
cells in the medulla, receive an internally generated input when a tethered fly attempts spontaneous 
turns (Kim et al. 2015). The signal is opposite in sign, and of an appropriate scale, to cancel the 
expected visual input of the corresponding rotation. Notably, this is not just inhibitory gating of the 
sensory system (which might seem too basic to require an emulator), but is directionally and 
temporally tuned to the expected feedback. Interestingly the authors suggest it may even play a role in 
causing the turn, by pre-charging the optomotor system with a phantom signal that induces a reflex 
response. This seems intriguingly close to the suggestion that (in general) motor control might be 
obtained by the brain predicting the expected sensory consequences, stimulating reflex arcs to bring 
this about (Friston et al. 2010). 
At the behavioural level, several studies in flying insects have shown head stabilisation against their 
own body manoeuvres occurs too rapidly to be caused by observing the induced visual slip, implying 
it is driven instead by an internal expectation. In the dragonfly, the correct movement requires 
compensation not only for the animal’s own motion but also for the expected trajectory of the small, 
moving target it is attempting to intercept, to keep this within a small high resolution area of the 
retina. By recording head and body motion in freely flying dragonflies to controlled targets (small 
beads resembling flies) the two effects could be separated. Compensatory head motions are made with 
effectively zero time lag for constant speed prey, while unexpected changes in prey motion cause a 
(delayed) reaction (Mischiati et al. 2014). Recordings from neurons in the dragonfly that are 
specifically tuned to small moving objects also show a form of selective attention, in which the 
response will track one of two moving objects, maintaining focus even when the cues for saliency of 
the second object are increased (Wiederman & O’Carroll 2013).  
A particularly interesting line of evidence comes from the consideration of associative learning 
mechanisms in insects. Although simple association is sometimes taken as the hallmark of non-
cognitive behaviour, the current dominant theoretical model is strongly tied to the notion of 
prediction, specifically in the form of prediction error as the signal that modulates the formation of 
associations (Schultz et al. 1997; Waelti et al. 2001). That is, the brain compares expected to actual 
reward and uses the difference to drive learning. In insects, the architecture of the key circuits 
underlying associative learning are being unravelled in exquisite detail, yet the direct evidence for a 
prediction error encoding (as opposed to a simple reward signal) is still sparse (Hammer & Menzel 
1998; Terao et al. 2015), despite models showing it can successfully account for insect behavioural 
data (Montague et al. 1995). I have previously argued that the insect mushroom body neuropil could 
be a plausible substrate for forward models in insects. This is supported by the structural resemblance 
of the circuitry to the cerebellum (Farris 2011), the region of the vertebrate brain for which the 
clearest evidence of predictive signalling to cancel expected sensory feedback has been obtained (Bell 
2001). Recent work on the fruitfly has provided important new insights into this structure, which is 
firmly established as a key site for olfactory memory (Aso et al. 2014). These include: the random 
connectivity of sensory inputs to a large number of parallel cells, which appears to implement the 
principle of high dimensional projection and sparse representation found in the support vector 
machine learning formalism (Huerta et al. 2004); a small number of output cells from this parallel 
structure, which if activated produce approach or avoidance behaviour, and whose response to a 
stimulus is altered after the stimulus has been paired with reward and punishment; a hierarchical 
structure within this set of output neurons; identification of dopaminergic neurons whose activation 
can substitute for reinforcement; substantial feedback connections from the output neurons to the 
dopaminergic neurons and to the input areas (Aso et al. 2014). The latter provides an obvious route by 
which prediction of reward could be conveyed, and prediction error calculated through inhibition. 
However as yet, proof of this function is elusive.     
The mushroom body is not the only insect brain structure implicated in learning. For example, a 
striking behaviour that has been demonstrated in cockroaches (Mizunami et al. 1998), crickets 
(Wessnitzer et al. 2008) and fruitflies (Foucaud et al. 2010) is a ‘place memory’ capacity equivalent to 
rats in the famous Morris water maze. In this paradigm, the rat learns to relocate a platform concealed 
in an opaque pool of water, quickly learning to search in the position indicated by distal visual cues. 
Insects are similarly challenged by being exposed to a hot floor on which they must locate an 
unmarked cool spot to obtain respite. After only a few trials, they can also relocate this position from 
a novel, arbitrary, starting position and will search for it (when missing) at the appropriate location 
relative to surrounding visual stimuli. Using neurogenetic methods to block activity in specific brain 
regions, it was found (in fruitflies) that mushroom body manipulation did not diminish performance, 
but the behaviour was dependent on a particular area of the central complex (Ofstad et al. 2011). As 
its name suggests, this is a centrally located neuropil in the insect brain that receives convergent input 
from many sensory processing areas, and has significant output to pre-motor areas (as well as 
feedback to sensory areas). The neuropil itself has a strikingly ordered architecture that includes 
multiple feedback loops. A further connection of this area to rat navigation has been provided by the 
demonstration that a (literal) ring of neurons in the lower part of this structure displays an activity 
bump that tracks the orientation of the fly relative to its surroundings (Seelig & Jayaraman 2015), in a 
manner highly reminiscent of theoretical models of rat ‘head direction’ cells (Zhang 1996). In 
particular, the activity bump persists when visual cues disappear, and will track the spontaneous turns 
made by the fly in darkness. As yet it is not clear if the latter effect is due to proprioceptive inputs, or 
could in fact be another example of internal prediction at work. 
This brings me to a third crossing point with Clark’s philosophical output, as encapsulated in his most 
recent book, ‘Surfing Uncertainty’. The core concept of ‘predictive processing’ (henceforth PP) Clark 
develops there goes beyond the argument that cognition involves internal signalling of expectations 
(which I have suggested applies equally to insects). In addition, Clark argues, the form of this 
prediction is a rich cascade of probabilistic generative models. Thus representation of the uncertainty 
of predictions, and applying Bayesian reasoning to deal with uncertainty, is at the heart of this account 
(as it has been in striking recent breakthroughs in AI, e.g. deep learning). Does the Bayesian account 
of human brains and cognition potentially extend to insects? So far, probabilistic processing in the 
insect brain is not supported by any neuroscientific results of which I am aware, and even for 
vertebrates, the neural evidence remains nebulous. As an alternative strategy, we could consider 
whether the kinds of behavioural evidence for probabilistic sensorimotor processing in humans have 
any parallels in insects. 
Perhaps the strongest line of evidence comes from the ‘optimal cue integration’ paradigm, which also 
conveniently lends itself to investigation in animal systems. This paradigm sets up a situation where a 
judgement about some property in the world – such as the size of an object – is made by an 
experimental subject based on several independent sensory cues – such as visual and haptic 
information. If the cues provide somewhat conflicting values, humans will make a judgement that 
combines the cues with weights proportional to their reliability, for example, trusting visual 
information less as noise is added to the image (Ernst & Banks 2002). Strikingly, these judgements 
appear to be in close quantitative match to the probabilistic optimum predicted by Bayes theorem, and 
multiple demonstrations of this general effect under a wide variety of situations are taken to be strong 
evidence that the brain must somehow encode the probability densities needed for Bayesian 
calculation, or (more realistically) a good approximation of it (Knill & Pouget 2004).  
We have recently carried out a behavioural experiment of exactly this form on ants (Wystrach et al. 
2015). Many species of ants are capable of  impressive navigation without chemical trails, exploiting 
a range of cues that include path integration based on a sky compass and visual memory for guidance 
by surrounding scenery (Wehner 2008). These capabilities are already interesting from a cognitive 
perspective: the ant’s nest is a small hole in the ground that cannot be perceived beyond a few 
centimetres but the ant keeps ‘mental’ track of the direction and distance of its nest, constantly 
updating its home vector according to its own movement. Keeping mental track of an object in the 
world while out of direct contact with it is arguably a hallmark of ‘truly representational’ processing. 
For the current discussion, however, the main interest is that the multiple navigational mechanisms 
used by the ant allow us to set up a cue conflict situation. An ant that has travelled outward and built 
up a home vector can be moved by the experimenter to a location where the visual memory cues 
indicate a conflicting direction in which to run home. Conveniently, some very general mathematical 
assumptions about how path integration error must accumulate for any animal with an external 
compass reference allow us to directly quantify the uncertainty associated with outward runs of 
different lengths. We found that the ants’ directional choices were a compromise between the two 
cues, with the relative weighting changing with the path length precisely as predicted by optimal 
Bayesian integration (Wystrach et al. 2015). 
So does this demonstrate that insect brains are doing probabilistic encoding? One additional 
experiment cast some doubt. We had used the outward path length to calculate the (Bayesian) 
weighting, but as the ants had run fairly straight, their home vector would have approximately the 
same length. Perhaps they could use home vector length as a ‘proxy’ for the actual uncertainty 
accumulated on the outward path, and hence the appropriate weighting to give to the home vector 
direction relative to visual memory? A direct way to test this was to uncouple the actual uncertainty of 
the path integrator, which depends on the total length of the outward route, from the home vector 
length, which depends on the straight-line distance home. By making ants run around in a fixed area 
for some time before release, the first should increase while the latter remains the same. We found 
that these ants took a homewards direction identical to those who had not experienced the added 
uncertainty, suggesting their weighting of the conflicting cues was unchanged, and supporting the 
proxy argument (Wystrach et al. 2015). Rather surprisingly, we also found that few studies of optimal 
cue integration in humans had controlled for the possibility that a proxy for uncertainty could drive 
the weighting, e.g., that decreasing visual contrast could be the direct cue driving a differential 
contribution of visual information to a decision. The proxy explanation is still non-trivial – e.g. the 
Bayesian weighting fits the behavioural results much better than a simple linear scaling of the weight 
with the cue of interest, for both ant and human data. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that the shape of 
the function to map from the proxy cue to the weighting (removing any need to encode probability 
densities) could be acquired, either through experience, or through evolution. The latter seems more 
plausible for the ant, as it is unlikely any individual ant gains enough experience during its lifetime to 
accurately tune such a function. 
This outcome, if our interpretation of the results is correct, raises a serious issue. If the ant’s ability to 
do optimal cue integration has been hard coded by evolution, does it still count as evidence for the PP 
view? It is clear that some supporters of this view, most notably Friston, would argue that it does: that 
indeed, not only innate behaviours but the innate physical structure of an animal represents a 
prediction of the interactions with the world it is likely to experience, acquired and tuned over time by 
the experiences of its ancestors. To give another example from ants: their eyes are sensitive to 
ultraviolet light, which enhances sky/ground contrast; such images can be stored as visual memories 
and used to recognise familiar locations; and the certainty of localisation can be shown to be 
substantially improved as a result (Stone et al. 2014). So the peripheral filtering for ultraviolet could 
be said to be as much an example of the predictive principle at work as any hypothetical internal use 
of the resulting certainty to balance the influence of visual memory against path integration. Indeed, 
Friston would argue that even the single celled organism’s adaptive fit to its niche falls within the PP 
(or ‘free energy’) explanatory scope.  
However, in ‘Surfing Uncertainty’ (2015) Clark departs company with Friston at these more extreme 
examples, preferring to use scare quotes for ‘prediction’ and ‘expectation’ when applied to cases such 
as the physical tuning of receptors to adaptively significant cues. I think in one sense this is wise – 
because there is a risk otherwise of debasing the whole PP programme into a restatement of the 
principle of evolution: organisms are adapted to their environmental niche.  However, in another 
sense it seems problematic for Clark’s claim that PP is the perfect partner for the embodied mind. 
Clark, at some points seems keen to encompass examples of problems solved through embodiment 
(such as the passive dynamic walker (McGeer 1990)) and associated cheap processing tricks to argue 
that “rich knowledge based strategies and fast frugal solutions are merely different points on a single 
scale” (p.251)  of PP. Yet at others he appears to introduce a dichotomy in which “bedrock adaptive 
states and responses” including inherited physical form and hardwired reflexes, are merely “setting 
the scene for the deployment (sometimes, in some animals) of more explicit prediction error 
minimizing strategies” (p.265) to add their magic.  
Indeed, Clark seems to consider some invertebrates outside the scope of the unifying PP theory, 
suggesting (Clark 2013) “the humble earthworm” may not experience “perceptual touch (as opposed 
to mere causal contact) with a distal world” (p243-244). Should we say the same of crickets, bees, 
dragonflies and ants, perhaps on the basis that they lack a cortex? I hope that the above survey might 
bring philosophers to hesitate before condemning these animals also to fall outside the scope of 
cognitive science. Whether they can be considered examples of cognitive systems that operate without 
PP, or an example of convergent evolution to the PP solution, they provide an interesting light on the 
entire debate.  
For example, this puts focus on whether cognitive adaptability is a diverse collection of neat tricks (of 
which PP is just one) or really is one, central, neat trick (PP). Indeed, as we start to flesh out the 
details of how PP is implemented in the brain, this distinction may start to dissolve: PP might be a 
necessary condition for a mind, but it is almost certainly not sufficient. This is aptly illustrated by the 
results of the recent DARPA challenge, in which many of the humanoid robots had the capacity to use 
sophisticated probabilistic generative models, but few were able to walk without falling over (Krotkov 
et al. 2017).  In the end, understanding the physical interfaces and basic reflexes may still be essential, 
and insects can provide a gateway to unravelling how mechanisms of predictive processing become 
embedded in such systems to enrich the capacity for successful, intelligent action in the real world. 
We should continue to think about minds beyond the cortex. 
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